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Open access under CCFlashbacks are involuntary, emotion-laden images experienced by individuals with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The qualities of ﬂashbacks could under certain circum-
stances lead to source memory errors. Participants with PTSD wrote a trauma narrative
and reported the experience of ﬂashbacks. They were later presented with stimuli from
ﬂashback and non-ﬂashback parts of their narrative, mixed with foils from the narrative
of another participant, and judged whether they belonged to their own narrative. They also
reported whether stimuli elicited a ﬂashback during this recognition test. Overall reporting
a ﬂashback at test was associated with signiﬁcantly better recognition performance. Flash-
backs were occasionally reported to foil stimuli, which were then likely to be wrongly
attributed to the person’s own narrative. This provides proof of concept of a cognitive
mechanism that could potentially account for some cases of false trauma memories.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that recovered memories of
trauma may or may not correspond to actual events
(Geraerts et al., 2009). Therapeutic suggestion may account
for some instances of false recall, but memory recovery
often occurs outside therapy (Brewin, 2012), requiring
alternative explanations. ‘Flashbacks’ are a symptom of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and are often
observed in patients recovering memories of traumatic
events (Andrews et al., 2000; Schooler, Bendiksen, &
Ambadar, 1997). They consist of a type of intense involun-
tary memory involving repeated reliving of the traumatic
event, accompanied by marked sensory detail and emo-
tional arousal (Brewin, 2007, 2011). High levels of sensory




 BY license.recollection (Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986; Suengas
& Johnson, 1988), suggesting that ﬂashbacks are likely to
be associated with previously experienced items and
events. However, if apparent recollections are in fact false,
the occurrence of a ﬂashback might lead them to be incor-
rectly labelled as true. This study attempted to establish
proof of concept of this hypothetical cognitive mechanism
for producing false recall.
In previous studies ﬂashbacks have been characterised
by traumatic events being reexperienced in the present
rather than the past (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess,
2010; Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004). They can vary
from relatively mild (there is a transient sense of the event
reoccurring in the present) to extreme (the person loses all
connection with their current autobiographical self and
present surroundings while reexperiencing the memory).
They are not typically reported in healthy participants
exposed to trauma (Brewin, 2011).
True memories are thought to possess on average more
detail than false memories, particularly sensory details
involving sights, sounds, and smells (Marche, Brainerd, &
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1988; Vrij, 2005), and are more likely to be associated with
a sense of recollection (Conway, Collins, Gathercole, &
Anderson, 1996; Heaps & Nash, 2001) and emotional
intensity (Heaps & Nash, 2001; Laney & Loftus, 2008).
Although many of these studies could be criticised for
confounding the truth or falsity of memories with memory
strength, the literature suggests that stimuli that elicit
reports of a ﬂashback at recall are, if true memories, more
likely to be correctly labelled as such. More rarely,
however, such apparent recollectionsmay be false, inwhich
case the occurrence of a ﬂashback may lead to them being
incorrectly labelled as true. The existence of this hypothet-
ical effect has never, to our knowledge, been demonstrated.
Individuals suffering from PTSD ﬁrst wrote a detailed
narrative account of their main traumatic event, and iden-
tiﬁed ﬂashback and non-ﬂashback sections. Single words
and phrases were then extracted from the two sections
of each person’s narrative and presented to them one week
later. Following previous work (Barclay & Wellman, 1986),
these were intermixed with foils supplied by a second indi-
vidual with PTSD . The task, which combined item and
source memory, was to recognise whether or not each
word or phrase belonged to their own narrative. Partici-
pants reported at the end of the testing session whether
each word or phrase had elicited a ﬂashback or not. Words
and phrases that elicited a ﬂashback, either during narra-
tive production or at recall, were expected to be rated at
recall as more arousing and of greater negative valence,
and to be better recognised. We also investigated whether
there were any instances in which participants reported
ﬂashbacks to stimuli from another person’s narrative, and
predicted that they should be more likely to incorrectly
classify any such words or phrases as their own.2. Method
2.1. Participants
There were 10 participants (3 men), all meeting diag-
nostic criteria for current PTSD when assessed with the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (First, Williams,
& Spitzer, 1997). They had experienced a range of traumas,
including involvement in disasters or terrorist attacks
(n = 3), interpersonal violence and robbery (n = 4), motor
vehicle accident (n = 1), abduction by security services
(n = 1), and witnessing of mother’s dying moments (n = 1).
Their average age was 40.3 years (SD 9.6, range 28–
57 years). Three were currently taking antidepressant
medication. All participants gavewritten informed consent.2.2. Measures
The Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) (Foa,
Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997) is a widely-used self-
report measure. Items measuring each of the 17 PTSD
symptoms are rated for the past month on a 0–3 scale. In
this sample the mean PDS score was 25.30 (SD = 5.85).
The Beck Depression Inventory 2 (Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996) is a widely-used 21-item self-report measure ofdepression severity. It contains 21 items that are scored
on a 4-point scale (possible range 0–63). Participants were
instructed to rate their mood over the past week. In this
sample the mean BDI score was 26.60 (SD = 10.66), indicat-
ing moderate depression (Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen,
& Ingram, 1987).
2.3. Procedure
Participants preparing to take part in an fMRI study
(Whalley, Kroes, Rugg, & Brewin, submitted for publication)
wrote an account of their traumatic event, starting from
just before they knew something was wrong until the point
where the event had resolved. Following Hellawell and
Brewin (2002), ﬂashbacks were deﬁned for participants
who then highlighted sections during the writing of which
they had experienced ﬂashbacks. Words identiﬁed by them
as belonging to the ﬂashback sections of their narrative
were tabulated separately from non-ﬂashback words and
were rated for frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967) and
number of letters. Lists of 36 ﬂashback words and 36
non-ﬂashback words were created and matched to ‘master
lists’ (see below) on word frequency and length. Phrases
(typically 2–8 words long) were tabulated separately using
the same procedure, and matched for length. Lists of 30
ﬂashback and non-ﬂashback phrases were matched to
‘master lists’ on number of letters and words per sentence.
Two ‘master lists’ were generated from other partici-
pants with PTSD to provide comparable stimuli unrelated
to the participant’s own traumatic event. One was from
an individual who had survived the July 7th 2005 London
bombings, and one from a survivor of the December 2004
Asian Tsunami. Certain words such as ‘blood’ or ‘helpless’
were common to many narratives, but words on the mas-
ter list were substituted on a case-by-case basis whenever
overlap was identiﬁed.
During a second testing session that occurred approxi-
mately one week later stimuli from participants’ own list
and one of the master lists were presented randomly on
a screen at a distance of approximately 50 cm while partic-
ipants were being scanned. Single words were presented in
the centre of the screen in uppercase 40pt, Arial font, and
phrases in lowercase 30pt Arial font. The task in each case
was to identify whether each word came from their narra-
tive or from the narrative of another participant and to re-
spond as quickly and accurately as possible using a button-
box. For both tasks (task 1: words; task 2: sentences) the
presentation of an item was preceded by an asterisk ()
for 500 ms, followed by the item for (1000 ms in task 1,
1700 ms in task 2), followed by a ﬁxation cross for
2000 ms. These sequences of events gave stimulus onset
asynchronies for tasks 1 and 2 of 3500 ms, and 4200 ms
respectively. At the end of this session participants were
shown a list of the stimuli and were asked to identify
which, if any, items had led to them having ﬂashbacks dur-
ing the task. Participants were then given lists of all the
stimuli they had seen during the test and were asked to
rate each item on separate 7-point Likert scales measuring
valence (scale anchored with [1] Unpleasant and [7] Pleas-
ant) and arousal (scale anchored with [1] Low arousal and
[7] High arousal).
Table 1
Mean percentage of ﬂashbacks, mean valence, mean arousal, and mean accuracy of recognition of single words and phrases from own and control narratives
(standard deviations in parentheses).
Narrative Section Percent ﬂashbacks during recognition Valence Arousal Recognition accuracy
Single words
Own Flashback 41.42 (27.63) 2.13 (.88) 5.78 (.90) .81 (.09)
Own Non-ﬂashback 23.35 (20.89) 3.46 (.94) 4.25 (1.18) .76 (.12)
Other Flashback 6.12 (6.26) 3.99 (1.17) 3.36 (1.32) .71 (.13)
Other Non-ﬂashback 1.11 (1.94) 3.95 (1.38) 3.16 (1.32) .72 (.12)
Phrases
Own Flashback 54.61 (32.78) 1.75 (.48) 6.05 (.51) .89 (.09)
Own Non-ﬂashback 31.97 (25.76) 3.04 (1.08) 4.87 (1.05) .88 (.08)
Other Flashback 2.00 (4.49) 3.59 (1.62) 3.43 (1.47) .88 (.08)
Other Non-ﬂashback 2.00 (3.58) 4.06 (1.32) 2.99 (1.27) .89 (.10)
N.B. Own ﬂashback = own narrative items that elicited a ﬂashback at production; Own Non-ﬂashback = own narrative items that did not elicit a ﬂashback at
production; Other Flashback = control PTSD narrative items that elicited a ﬂashback at production; Other Non-ﬂashback = control PTSD narrative items that
did not elicit a ﬂashback at production.
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3.1. Reliability and validity of ﬂashback judgments
As shown in Table 1, experiencing a ﬂashback during
the recognition test was reported to approximately half
the stimuli which had elicited a ﬂashback during produc-
tion of the participant’s own narrative (Own Flashback
items) and to a quarter of stimuli that had not done so
(Own Non-ﬂashback items). Experiencing a ﬂashback to
items from the control PTSD narrative (Other Flashback
and Other Non-ﬂashback items) was rare. We tested the
reliability of ﬂashback judgements with a 2 (Content:
Words vs. Phrases)  4 (Narrative Section: Own Flashback,
Own Non-ﬂashback, Other Flashback, Other Non-ﬂash-
back) ANOVA on the percentage of ﬂashbacks endorsed
during the recognition test. After Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rection for departure from sphericity there were signiﬁcant
effects of Content (F(1, 9) = 6.54, p < .05, partial eta
squared = .42), Narrative Section (F(3, 27) = 21.97,
p < .001, partial eta squared = .71), and the Content x Nar-
rative Section interaction (F(3, 27) = 6.54, p < .01, partial
eta squared = .42).
A follow-up 1-way ANOVA showed that, collapsing
across words and phrases, the numbers of ﬂashbacks in
all sections differed from each other signiﬁcantly (Own
Flashback 15.65, Own Non-ﬂashback 9.00, Other Flashback
1.40, Other Non-ﬂashback .50; p < .05). Follow-up t-tests
showed that Own Flashback phrases led to a higher per-
centage of ﬂashbacks than Own Flashback Words,
t(9) = 3.13, p < .02, whereas Other Flashback words led to
more ﬂashbacks than Other Flashback phrases,
t(9) = 3.69, p < .01. There were no differences between
Own Non-ﬂashback words and phrases, or between Other
Non-ﬂashback words and phrases, largest t(9) = 1.86,
p > .05. As the data were not normally distributed the anal-
yses were repeated using nonparametric Friedman and
Wilcoxon tests for related samples, which yielded similar
ﬁndings.
The validity of the ﬂashback judgements was tested by
examining ratings of valence and arousal. A 2  4 ANOVA
on valence ratings showed a main effect of Narrative Sec-
tion (after Greenhouse-Geisser correction F(3, 18) = 7.61,p < .02, partial eta squared .56) but no effect of Content
(F(1, 6) = 2.36, p > .10), and no Content x Narrative Sec-
tion interaction (F(3, 18) = 1.95, p > .10). Collapsing across
Content, Own Flashback words and phrases (Mean = 1.94)
were rated as more negative (p < .05) than all other sec-
tions (Own Non-ﬂashback 3.25, Other Flashback 3.79,
Other Non-ﬂashback 4.00).
Ratings of arousal demonstrated an identical pattern,
with a main effect of Narrative Section (after Greenhouse-
Geisser correction F(3, 18) = 13.23, p < .01, partial eta
squared .69) but no effect of Content (F(1, 6) < 1) and no
Content x Narrative Section interaction (F(3, 18) = 1.29,
p > .10). Collapsing across Content, Own Flashback words
and phrases (Mean = 5.91) were rated as more arousing
(p < .05) than all other sections (Own Non-ﬂashback 4.56,
Other Flashback 3.40, Other Non-ﬂashback 3.08).
3.2. Association of ﬂashbacks with recognition
A similar analysis was conducted on recognition accu-
racy scores (hit/correct rejection rate). Accuracy rates were
too high to enable a separate test of misses. This showed
no effect of Narrative Section (F(3, 27) = 1.16, p > .05), and
no Narrative Section  Content interaction (F(3,
27) = 1.34, p > .05), but a main effect of Content (F(1,
9) = 80.64, p < .001, partial eta squared .90). Phrases (mean
hit rate .89) were recognised signiﬁcantly more accurately
than single words (mean hit rate .75). A further ANOVA
conducted on Own stimuli only tested whether Content,
Narrative Section, and the occurrence of a ﬂashback during
test predicted accuracy. The results indicated that report-
ing a ﬂashback during the recognition test (F(1,
8) = 13.52, p < .01, partial eta squared .63) was associated
with better recognition performance. There were no main
effects or 2-way interactions involving Content or having
had a ﬂashback during the original narrative, largest F(1,
8) = 2.64, p > .05. The 3-way interaction was signiﬁcant
(F(1, 8) = 11.90, p < .01, partial eta squared .60). Recogni-
tion was highest for phrases that had elicited a ﬂashback
both in the original narrative and at recall (mean hit rate
.96), and was lowest for single words that had not elicited
a ﬂashback either in the original narrative or at recall
(mean hit rate .69).
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reported a ﬂashback on presentation of a stimulus from the
control PTSD narrative and, if so, what was the effect on
recognition judgements. Seven participants reported one
or more examples of this response, which occurred an
average of 3.80 times (median 2, range 1–16, SD 5.14) dur-
ing the course of the experiment. In this group the mean
accuracy of these responses was compared with their
mean accuracy when stimuli from the control narrative
did not elicit a ﬂashback. A paired t-test indicated that
mean accuracy when a ﬂashback was experienced (.29)
was very low, with the stimuli being incorrectly judged
as their own, compared to when a ﬂashback was not expe-
rienced (.81). This difference was large in magnitude and
highly signiﬁcant, t(6) = 4.56, p = .004, d = 1.72. Removal
of the single outlier who reported 16 examples of this re-
sponse did not change the results.4. Discussion
In this investigation ﬂashback judgments showed mod-
erate levels of reliability, clearly indicating the probabilis-
tic nature of ﬂashback elicitation by verbal cues.
Consistent with previous research (Hellawell & Brewin,
2002; 2004), they also had valid external referents in the
form of valence and arousal ratings, suggesting that partic-
ipants with PTSD can meaningfully discriminate the occur-
rence of a ﬂashback. Memory accuracy was not
consistently better for stimuli that had elicited a ﬂashback
report during narrative production, a ﬁnding which may
have been due to a lack of statistical power.
However, consistent with autobiographical memory re-
search suggesting that true memories are characterised by
greater emotion and greater sensory detail, reporting a
ﬂashback at test was associated with signiﬁcantly greater
recognition accuracy. At present it is not clear whether
higher accuracy can be accounted for by greater arousal,
greater negative valence, greater reliving, or some other
characteristic.
Previous research on ﬂashbulb memories has conﬁrmed
that recall for even highly emotional events can be inaccu-
rate (Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Schmolck, Buffalo, & Squire,
2000). Emotional stimuli, relative to neutral stimuli, ap-
pear to produce a stronger sense of recollection even when
they are not objectively remembered more accurately
(Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004). In hypnosis research,
the credibility of a suggested past-life experience was pre-
dicted by the subjective intensity of that experience (Spa-
nos, Menary, Gabora, DuBreuil, & Dewhirst, 1991).
We extended these ﬁndings by demonstrating that on
those rare occasions when foil items were associated with
a powerful involuntary trauma image, the items were very
likely to be misclassiﬁed. The effect size obtained was
equivalent to the foil items being 8.5 times more likely to
be classiﬁed as from the participants’ own narrative in
the presence of a ﬂashback than in its absence. These data
provide the ﬁrst proof of concept of a potential mechanism
for explaining some occurrences of false recovered trauma
memories in clinical samples. Although foil stimuli were
selected for being thematically unrelated to the partici-pant’s traumatic event, it is conceivable that they did in
fact have some association with information in the under-
lying memory representation. Similarly, it has been argued
that in the clinic false memories do not arise de novo but
may be based in part on memories of real events (Mollon,
1998). Thus in many cases false memories may be better
conceived of as substantially false (but partially correct)
memories.
Among the limitations of the study is that the effect of
presenting large numbers of personally-relevant cues in
proximity to one another is unknown. Had presentation
been interspersed with a greater amount of unrelated
material, so that stimuli from the participant’s own narra-
tive occurred more rarely, or had presentation not taken
place inside a brain scanner, rates of reported ﬂashback
elicitation may have been very different. Replication is re-
quired using larger samples, different types of stimuli
(including events rather than just words), and different
types of eliciting context. The data do, however, add to
our extremely limited knowledge concerning ﬂashback re-
ports and may provide a platform for better theorizing in
the future. They also, more tentatively, add to existing re-
search suggesting cognitive mechanisms that may some-
times mislead individuals recovering traumatic memories
into wrongly classifying imaginary events as being part
of their personal history (Brewin, 2012; Geraerts et al.,
2009; Loftus & Davis, 2006).Acknowledgement
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